Analysis Of Christopher Lewis Incentives, Criminality, And Blame

In Christopher Lewis' Inequality, Incentives, Criminality, and Blame, he posits, "that the disadvantaged have incentives to commit crime, and develop criminogenic dispositions, that limit the extent to which their co-citizens can blame them for breaking the law" (Lewis 153). Expanding on this notion, Lewis introduces a theory suggesting that citizens cannot justifiably blame the disadvantaged for their criminal actions due to the intricate interplay between ethics, blame, and perceived causes of criminality. He argues, "we are justified in blaming others for their actions only to the extent that we are in a moral position to hold them to a standard that attitude fails to meet" (161). This paper criticizes Lewis’ second blame condition, asserting

The allure of economic gain, coupled with limited opportunities for legitimate advancement, leads individuals to resort to illicit means to survive or thrive. Additionally, repeated exposure to adverse circumstances can foster criminogenic dispositions, such as mistrust of authority, resentment towards societal norms, and a skewed perception of risk and reward. The analysis of these factors reveals how they intersect to limit the extent of blame society can place on the disadvantaged. While individuals are ultimately responsible for their actions, the structural barriers and coercive influences they face complicate the attribution of moral culpability. As such, the blame directed towards the disadvantaged may be mitigated by acknowledging the broader social context in which their actions unfold. Lewis creates two conditions to blame: The prospective blamer has to have good evidence of such an attitude. The prospective blamer has to be in the moral position to blame the target of their blame for having that attitude. We will focus on this

Lewis brings up a philosophical normative objection to this argument, claiming, “all that matters when thinking about the appropriateness of blame is whether, and to what extent, a given action manifests a morally inappropriate attitude. It doesn't matter where that attitude comes from” (173). Lewis extends this philosophical argument to Anderson's framing, suggesting that one could argue that those who are “products of their environment” may be unfortunate to have been shaped by their environment, considering they didn't select their upbringing. However, their actions still reflect their attitudes, providing ample grounds to assign blame proportionate to their actions. To address this objection, Lewis makes his argument clear on his positionality of blame: if we, as citizens, actively contribute to the development of criminogenic subcultures in disadvantaged communities, then it becomes unjust for us to blame the residents of those communities for embodying the attitudes ingrained in those subcultures (174). Living within such environments, individuals often feel compelled to adhere to the prevailing culture or "code of the street" as a means of