Bernard Williams And Peter Singer Analysis

Bernard Williams and Peter Singer both explore the ethics of human favouritism over all other species. While Singer is convincing in his arguments that established the term ‘specieism’, Williams is ultimately persuasive in his defence of this ‘human prejudice’. Both arguments stem from the same base, an observation that humans exhibit bias in favour of their own species over other living beings simply because they are not of the same species. Singer labels this attitude as “specieism”, and he argues that this bias is akin to racism and sexism,. For Williams, this attitude is inherent to the human condition, where he terms the ‘human prejudice’ – a perspective that results in humans treating other species differently, but not one that is comparable

Williams uses the term instead of ‘speciesism’, to label the way we act towards beings outside of our species. The definition is equivalent, and the use comes down to disagreeing that this attitude is analogous to other “isms” such as racism (Williams 2009, p. 139). Williams explains that racists often didn't, and still don't use different race as the fundamental basis for demonstrating inequality, such as “because they are black”. Usually this type of racial discrimination is founded on an assessment of the “intellectual and moral weakness of blacks” (Williams 2009, p. 140). The exploitation of animals that results from ‘speciesism’, in contrast, requires little more justification than non-human status (Williams 2009, p. 140). For Williams, this inherent human-centred perspective is justified. As there is no ultimate point of view within the universe from which we can claim a species-neutral frame of reference, all we have to work with is our human point of view from which all of our actions derive meaning (Williams 2009, p. 137). For Williams, this in itself leads to an argument where “humanity” is used as a label to describe the ethical concept of remaining loyal to our own species: “no creature belonging to some other species can articulate, reflect on, or be motivated by reasons appealing to their species membership” (Williams 2009, p. 150). Through the

Singer strikes a chord logically, asking the reader to think introspectively and critically about their morals. A creature being outside of our genetic species does seem like an arbitrary line to draw when considering the moral relevance of their exploitation. It is here that his utilitarian thought believably comes into play, that the only discerning value in equality is a beings ability to suffer, which also seems rational. His analogy of specieism to racism further gives plausibility to his rejection, as racial discrimination has been vehemently rebuked in today’s society, and the distinction is hard to argue without simply saying we are justified in our exploitation just because we are “human beings”. Ironically, this is where Williams says we are completely defensible in this right. The lack of a universal truth from which we can judge ethics leaves us with little option but to trust our perspective. The lack of abstract theory gives pragmatic weight to his argument that relates to the way we feel. It is on this argument that we can see the lack of the claim in the weakness of animals as a distinct division from racism. Finally as being human is a consideration for which no other species can claim, it is a unique membership, no other creature can similarly reflect on their species identity introspectively. It is from