Compare And Contrast Versions Of The National Strategy For Countering Weapons Of Mass Destruction

Introduction The landscape of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats and countermeasures has evolved significantly between 2018 and 2023, as reflected in the respective Department of Defense (DOD) strategies for countering WMD. This paper aims to analyze the changes in assessment, priorities, and focus between the 2018 and 2023 versions of the national Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction by analyzing noticeable changes or shifts in the threat landscape, joint force capabilities, international cooperation, logistical challenges, and research and development strategies. This analysis will highlight the annual strategies’ well-crafted and robust assessment and approach to an increasingly complex and dynamic WMD threat environment,

If not, the assessments largely fail to provide specific direction. It is not unusual for strategic-level objectives to remain somewhat vague and allow for greater definition by the agencies or departments themselves. The question remains – what has been accomplished within a 5-year span if the 2018 objective to “build a Joint Force” remains in 2023? If a reasonably strong Joint Force existed, the 2023 strategy should have changed to something along the lines of “continue building,” “enhance,” or “strengthen.” The strategies suggest that little, if any, progress has been made. While this may be an inaccurate reflection of internal capabilities, it is certainly concerning and deserving of further

This principle, rooted in ancient military wisdom such as illustrated in Sun Tzu's Art of War, emphasizes that accurate intelligence is crucial for success in all military confrontations. Sun Tzu's doctrine places intelligence and self-awareness as the most consequential element of victory, through evaluating one's own strengths and understanding the power of deceit. This doctrine states that a military leader with accurate intelligence about both their own abilities and those of their enemies would never lose a single battle (Tzu, n.d., p. 42). In the context of WMD, this doctrine is no less significant. A nation may possess advanced technology, weapons, and equipment to combat WMD use, but these assets can be rendered ineffective if intelligence is inaccurate. For instance, a missile defense system is only as effective as its ability to detect foreign threats. The introduction of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence and deep fakes, has further complicated this challenge, introducing new dimensions to the threat of WMD. In this evolving landscape, a malicious actor may not need to possess actual nuclear weapons – they might only need to convince a nation that they are under attack from someone who legitimately possesses them. Fortunately, the annual strategies each thoroughly discuss