Consequentialist Theory Of Incommensurability

Finnis’ incommensurability thesis demonstrates that basic goods and their instantiations cannot be measured against each other. However, Wright presupposes that the incommensurability thesis strictly imperils “our common sense belief that sometimes people are morally bound to choose one practical option over a competing option despite the fact that the competing option is itself rationally grounded”, i.e. grounded in another basic value. He claims that there must be some commensurability between goods in order to save the common sense belief and to ensure that choices between rationally grounded options are not arbitrary.

If Wright’s need of commensurability holds true, a consequence of this finding is that it would be difficult to see

The consequentialist theory proposes that an individual must select the option, which leads to the greatest proportion of good overall. The point of contention between defenders and critics of the incommensurability thesis is whether the basic goods and their instantiations as they figure in options for choice, are commensurable objectively. Thus like Robert George, I believe that the question as to whether subjective commensuration is possible is not at issue here, this is because one can subjectively prefer one good to another. I feel that Wright is seeking a form of objective commensurability, to ensure that choices between rationally grounded possibilities for action are non-arbitrary. This is the form of commensurability that consequentialists accept and advocates of the incommensurability thesis repudiate. Wright asserts that denying the ability of ascertaining morally correct choices amid rationally grounded choices, by weighing the basic values against each other, supporters of the incommensurability thesis undercut the prospect of non-arbitrary results in cases of morally significant choice. Despite Wright’s opinion and the opinions of consequentialists, I maintain that the incommensurability thesis does not lead to the proposition that choices between rationally grounded options are necessarily

One does not have to act against the good of ‘play’ in order to save the drowning child. This therefore shows that there does not need to be an intention to act against any of the basic goods. I propose that there is a positive duty to save the child’s life on the criteria of fairness. This is because the sailor can resume sailing some other time, whereas the child’s life cannot be resurrected at a later date. If the sailor continues to sail as opposed to saving the child’s life, he will be guilty of an immoral act in omitting to save the child, where he would not have majorly risked his own life. This hypothetical situation exemplifies how Finnis’ theory practically deals with conflicts between incommensurable goods using practical reasonableness. Thus this disproves Wright’s claim that the goods are commensurable, and also disproves the consequence of Wright’s claim; namely that if the goods are commensurable, then we may not have rights at all. Therefore Finnis’ theory is successful in creating distinct