moral concerns and specifically stresses the concept of treating humanity not merely as means but as ends. However, Silber, like most Kantian formalists denies the possibility of supplementing C2. In Silber’s view, C2 as a limiting condition on valid maxims expresses merely a negative condition that one never treats others as means. Kant also explained that C2 acts solely as a limiting condition.
In the idea of an absolutely good will [one] good without any qualifying condition (of attainment of this or that end)—complete abstraction must be made from every end that has to come about as an effect…And so the end must here be conceived, not as an end to be effected, but as an independently existing end. Hence it must be conceived only negatively,
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Several of Hegel’s arguments against the formalism identified in Kant’s moral philosophy are still widely accepted. For further details, please review the prior discussion of Hegel’s criticisms of Kant in section 1.1.1 of this paper.
Silber notes that Hegel’s criticisms of C1 are based on the principle of consistency or more specifically the inconsistencies in Kant’s thought, which hold only limited applicability for deriving logical maxim mistakes, i.e. ‘I want to stay dry by walking naked in the rain.’ CI is thus charged with emptiness that lacks meaning. Therefore, Silber seeks to demonstrate that C1 represents not mere logical consistency, but most importantly, volitional consistency, which conforms to practical reason, not necessarily logical
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However, O’Neill recognizes that the universality test in C1 is not a simple matter. She, therefore, unpacks the test with great care in order to more clearly explicate and detail Kant’s formulation of universal law and thereby defend it as a non-heteronymous ethic. She elucidates her claim by noting that her constructivist ideas ‘‘challenge the view that Kantian ethics…must be seen as either trivially empty or relying covertly on heteronymous considerations in order to derive substantive conclusions.’’(O’Neill Constructions 82) O’Neill’s approach addresses the problems that Silber faces when he seeks to supplement the universality procedure (Silber’s approach is unsuccessful for that heteronomy was introduced into the universality