A Comparison Of Hume's Account Of Self And Personal Identity

In David Hume’s account of self and personal identity recorded in book I of the Treaties, it is stated that self is but a bundle of perceptions. He questions the assumptions made with regard to the existence of self and states that there is no basis to believe that the self exists or that perceptions are bind together by a self over time. All that can ever be known are the perceptions that are available to across a period of time, and therefore the perceived self is just a series of perceptions that have resemblance and cause-and-effect amongst them.

As a much-debated theory within the philosophical realm, his views are often the topic of discussion and argument, only to note that there is a shift from just merely attacking the view directly

Although at first glance, the passages seem to be in contradiction, both texts in actuality are purporting the same point. On the note that the two hypotheses in the appendix are not in conflict, one turns to book I of the treaties for clarification. Hume had already put forth that his account is not a principle that binds all perceptions together, or that the self he discovered is a perfect one formed by amalgamating perceptions. And his account is defective in that sense. This is then in accordance to what was being recorded in the appendix where it is stated that the account of Hume is flawed as one that connects different perceptions. If this is so, the two passages are compatible in essence, communicating that self as a bundle of perceptions does not explain that there is a principle of connexion. This consistency ought to strengthen and advance Hume’s account of self and personal

Whilst there are many different kinds of naturalist, in this paper we will subscribe to naturalism to be simply that nature is all we need to justify our beliefs. In Hume’s investigation of the mind, his emphasis on actions as well as beliefs that are not founded on reasoning along side with human as a creature of habit , continues to affirm his stance as a naturalist. This is especially so on matter concerning the mind, which also includes his position on self and personal identity. The naturalistic view of the self should be understood with the help of Martin and Barresi’s exposition where the idea of self is no longer supernatural and the understanding of the it is grounded in experience of the natural world. As a naturalist, Hume addresses a few questions with regards to self - “How does one explain the concept of self?”, “Why do we believe in what we do?” and “If there is an unchanging fundamentals of a