Deepwater Horizon Decision-Making Biases

To what extent did the decision-making biases impact the decisions made in the case of Deepwater Horizon; as we identify the specific biases that were present concerning BP 's and Transocean 's approach more characteristic of the rational, normative, or garbage can models of decision making, we learn how each of them affect the course of decision-making process.

Bounded rationality, it is very likely that both BP and Transocean were set in situations that restricted each of them from really becoming a team. In the final stages of their disastrous night, both BP and Transocean were at odds, however, there is an indication that BP manages their team differently than the criteria were reducing rational decision making among both BP and Transocean (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013, p. 333). Other indicators inform us as readers in the case study, if this was the case one team began an investigation while another continue work on a faulty well, all the while communicating everything was alright Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013m,p. 362). There seems to be more evidence towards neither teams had come to any type of satisficing, simply because of the lack of process to accomplish a job well done, an uncertainty of needs to

For this particular case study, the Garbage can model describes that all the incidents that occurred on the Deepwater Horizon came together due to bias decision choices. The fall-out of what should have been an oil producing rig with no harm to the environment, unfortunately, falls into this category, it is messy, sticky and unattractive just as Dr. Kinicki expresses in his lecture (Kinicki, 2013) due to the unorganized, however, it does have order, yet despite this the trash can model looks the where the problem began, the solution, who are the participants, and the choice opportunities (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013, p. 333), nevertheless, even BP and Transocean lost sight of this formula due to their "over competence and incompetence" (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013,