Defense Of Virtue In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

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In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes the case that a life cannot be happy without friends. In Book IX.9 he argues that even a person who possesses every virtue cannot be truly happy without philia, for “it seems strange, when one assigns all good things to the happy man, not to assign friends.” (1169b). He specifies that a truly happy man will possess at least one friendship of the good that is based not in unnecessary utility or pleasure, but in a mutual admiration of the other’s virtuous character. He says that these friendships of the good are the greatest external good and maintains that they are vital to a happy life. Aristotle concludes that the key to living a true life of happiness, fulfillment, and well-being or eudaimonia, lies in a life surrounded by friends and cannot be found within a life of solitude. While Book IX.9 focuses on the defense of

Aristotle claims that activity is easier in groups and among friends. This recalls the idea that happiness is an activity of “soul exhibiting virtue” introduced in Book I.8 (1098a). In Book IX.9, Aristotle explains how friends provide an occasion to be active and how that action becomes in itself pleasurable among friends because we are pleased by seeing virtue. He compares the pleasure we feel by witnessing virtue to the pleasure a musician enjoys beautiful music. This is important to his argument because in Book I.8 he stresses that a good man ought to delight in virtuous activity. Aristotle describes happiness as virtuous activity and that the truly happy man must rejoice in performing virtuous activities, otherwise he is merely continent, thus virtuous actions must be in themselves pleasant. It is easier to be active with friends because they make activity pleasant and provide encouragement for participation in virtuous