1943 Airpower History

14 June 1943 remains a pivotal moment in the history of airpower, one that resonates with influential air theorist Giulio Douhet - "aircraft are instruments of offense of incompatible potentialities, against which no effective defense is foreseen”1. Codenamed Operation Pointblank, it was the brainchild of Supreme Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower who recognised that one of the keys to achieving victory on D-Day was by having overwhelming air superiority over Normandy skies2. Over the next few months, General Eisenhower's plan of widespread aerial attacks had effectively cripple the Nazi air forces and destroyed their transportation system, thus aiding the amphibious assault over Normandy on D-Day. Such victories accentuate the undeniable

The RAF doctrine defines airpower as - the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events.3 Undoubtedly, airpower has had a strategic and effective impact on joint warfare with notable examples such as Operation Desert Storm and Operation Matterhorn to say the least. Conversely, military strategists has rebutted at the fact that aerial campaigns such as Operation Rolling Thunder and the "Stinger Effect" during the Soviet-Afghan War showcased that the limitations of airpower with the ever-changing landscape and nature of war would greatly affect the desired outcome from airpower. More so considering the current global security landscape, in which it is to be noted that symmetric warfare may have taken a brief absence, with asymmetric warfare and small wars to be seemingly apparent. On that note, this essay will prove that, whilst prevalent and effective, airpower itself may not be suffice to win small wars and instead, it will delve into the role of airpower vis-à-vis small wars, as part of a tandem force to achieve victory. Notwithstanding, this essay will also aim to address the limitations of airpower to be comprehended in order to maximise its potential for a swift and decisive

This will determine which of the contestants has to suffer operational and tactical disadvantages and be forced throughout the battle into adopting compromise solutions”14. Indeed, as echoed by General Erwin Rommel, airpower continues to be a significant instrument of deterrence and force multiplier when employed as part of a Joint effort for nations to achieve their aims. However, airpower in small wars are generally not effective at the operational or strategic levels of war but can be decisive during engagements with enemy forces at the tactical level15. Notable tactical advantages include, but not limited to, Close Air Support (CAS) - the direct support of troops on the ground by air assets, as well as Tactical Airlifts - deploying resources and material into a specific location with high precision. Despite this paradigm shift from a traditionally intensive role to one of supporting, such aerial missions does not negate the true value of airpower. Increasingly, it is the sheer flexibility and adaptability nature of airpower to showcase its asymmetrical advantages during such small