Eisenhower And Dulles Rhetorical Analysis

The legacy that Truman and his administration left for Eisenhower and Dulles was the transformation of the U.S. into a country that could lead the free world. He set the foundations needed for the U.S. to transition from isolationism, disarmament, and neutrality into a nation which would resist the spread of communism through collective security and arms-buildup. For Dulles and the Eisenhower administration, their determination and resolve would be tested. When it came to crises such as Suez and NATO, the Hungarian revolution, Berlin, and the U-2 incident, U.S. foreign policy was molded and was exemplified through the rhetoric of Eisenhower and Dulles. Their version of American foreign policy had mixed results and mostly kept the status quo.

The U.S. instead pursued a relationship with Nasser in the hopes that they could sway him to be on “the side of the angels.” Clearly, the beliefs behind the Great Britain and the U.S. differed. As stated in Kissinger, “Dulles seemed to be writing off the whole affair as colonial imbroglio which the United States, determined to preserve its image of moral purity, would not touch.” (Kissinger 537). However, what Ambrose points out more during the Suez crisis is the motivation of American influence in an oil rich area. The actions during the Suez crisis showed how the rhetoric of Eisenhower and Dulles pointed in the opposite direction the British and French expected. The U.S. saw the crisis as an opportunity to keep their word as a moral and unbiased nation. Unfortunately, the U.S. did not comprehend how Suez was supposed to be a problem of containment and not colonialism. Kissinger brought up the point on how Suez was merely an exercise for the U.S. to act as the leader of the free world. (Kissinger 544). Had the U.S. effectively condemned not only the British and French, but also the Soviet manipulation in Hungary, the U.S. might have actually been seen as new and strong

Kissinger detailed how Dulles drummed up support for liberation for East European states. These “captive nations” were treated with the rhetoric that they would be supported by the U.S. in their reach for freedom. However, when Dulles spoke of “liberation” he never meant for Hungary or other nations to call for an uprising. The truth of the matter was something called “liberation theory.” “In practice, Dulles’ liberation theory was an attempt to increase the cost to Moscow of consolidating its conquests without increasing the risks for the United States.” (Kissinger 553). This was the major difference between traditionalist and revisionist viewpoints on liberation. Ambrose declared that the Eisenhower administration never planned on risking nuclear war for East Europe let alone Hungary. On October 31, 1956, Hungary attempted to break away from the Warsaw pact and tens of thousands of Hungarian lives were lost. Those students who fought against the Soviet forces were relying on U.S. intervention to help turn the tide and win their independence. The disaster in Hungary demonstrated the flawed policies of the Eisenhower and Dulles. Their big-talk of liberation and intervention did not externalize into