Enlightenment And The Scottish Enlightenment

This essay considers the interactions of three prominent thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment on the “Science of Man” that expanded the understanding of the facets of human nature. The Scottish Enlightenment was a socio-political system in the eighteenth century in response to the old regime of absolute monarchy1. The Monarchs expanded the authority of God by establishing the concept of divine right. In opposition, intellectuals attempted to seek a different method of inspecting human nature, hence the topic of science of man was established. (ASDASDASDASDASD) Science of man in the Scottish Enlightenment included several philosophical systems and prominent theorists in the broader Enlightenment. Hume first introduces his version of “Science

Hume proved his claim by first disproving reason as the foundation of morality, then proving sentiment as the true foundation of morality. Thereupon, Hume specified sympathy as the sentiment forming the basis of morality by claiming that sentiments of moral approval and disapproval are caused by the functions of sympathy.

 Although Hume believed it was possible for both reason and sentiment to work together to make moral decisions, he disagreed with the idea of reason being the sole foundation of morality: "It appears evident that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted by reason” (Hume, 144). The reason was due to the practical nature of morality. Strangely enough, as reason does not provoke people into action, it was unable to be the cause of moral conduct. Furthermore, according to Hume: ”What is honourable, what is fair, what is becoming, what is noble, what is generous, takes possession of the heart, and animates us to embrace and maintain it. What is intelligible, what is evident, what is probable, what is true, procures only cool assent of the understanding; and gratifying a speculative curiosity, puts an end to our research” (Hume, 150). Without fervour and warm feelings we have for virtue (sentiment), morality would lose its practical

For example, they both believed that whatever role reason might have in explaining moral thought, an appeal to reason alone, unattended by sentiment, was inadequate. Moreover, they believed that what causes and what frustrates human happiness, what generates gratitude or resentment, and what conforms to or violates certain principles, would leave an undiscovered distinction favouring any of these facts over the others. Furthermore, they both believed that our capacity to sympathise with the sentiments of others is crucial. If that capacity for sympathy were entirely absent, so too would be moral thought and