Introduction June the 22nd, the year 1941, Germany launches “…the most powerful invasion force in history” across the border of Soviet Russia. That assessment of the invasion is surely accurate, as “Nineteen panzer divisions, 3,000 tanks, 2,500 aircraft, and 7,000 artillery pieces pour across a thousand-mile front.” Despite the temptation to analyze this singular event from the perspective of logistics, planning, and execution (on the part of both sides), which could, and have, filled volumes, the most important part of the operation was how this action, on the part of Germany, finally drew the lines of conflict that had been elusive up until that point. Was an alliance with the Soviet Union a genuine possibility, as suggested by some historians such as Alexander Hill, or were these actions simply measures to buy time and advantage, a position held by others such as Gerhard L. Weinberg.
The Fall of Poland and Its Influence on Pre-Invasion Ambiguities Perhaps the two greatest powers to face pre-Barbarossa ambiguity were the Empire of Japan and the Soviet Union. For both of these nations the confusion stems back to 1939 with the German invasion of Poland.
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“By that time there could not be the slightest doubt that German operations were merely some sort of provocation, on the evening of 22 June Stalin…issued Directive Number 3 for a counter-offensive against the invading forces.” Despite the extensive preparations though, the Red Army was still ill equipped to deal with the invading Wehrmacht, particularly given the devastation unleashed upon their air forces by the German surprise attack. This caused Stalin to look for support from the one nation still actively fighting against Germany, the nation that had been courting Soviet support since before the Winter War: Great