Examples Of New Whitewash Of Fdr's Failure To Bomb Auschwitz

Still today, the allies decision to not bomb the Nazi death camp Auschwitz is discussed and questioned. One side claims that it was a huge failure, as well as a show of how much the allies actually cared for the jews, while the other argues that it was a much more complex decision; and that ultimately, the war effort had to be diverted elsewhere in order to defeat the nazis. The many different arguments and pieces of evidence on both sides make one wonder exactly how such a difficult decision should be made, especially under such pressure, and what should be prioritised in war. In this circumstance, the allies chose to put their efforts elsewhere; which one side claims ended the war quicker, rather than committing the symbolic act of attacking

Medoff criticises Alonzo Hamby’s Franklin D. Roosevelt biography which defends Roosevelt’s decision to not bomb Auschwitz on the ground that the target was out of reach for the US planes. However, this claim can easily be deconstructed; Medoff argues against it by bringing up quotes by US senator George McGovern, who flew over the concentration camp himself. McGovern is quoted saying “it was certainly worth the effort, despite all the risks,”, believing that such an action could have greatly slowed down the mass murder process that took place in Auschwitz. There is even further evidence, not mentioned in the article, that the planes indeed did fly over Auschwitz, such as the aerial photographs of Auschwitz from 1944, exhibited on Yad Vashem’s website. In “New Eyewitness Testimony About U.S. Failure to Bomb Auschwitz” also by Rafael Medoff, holocaust survivor Lidia Vago remembers being told about the death of some SS men after US planes accidentally bombed the railway line leading up to Auschwitz, on their way to the oil factories nearby. Medoff concludes that the Roosevelt biography would inevitably exonerate the Roosevelt administration from its decision to not bomb the largest Nazi death camp, in order to put Roosevelt in a positive light. In this circumstance, the personal accounts and quotes from people who were in the in or around Auschwitz seem to

Thus the evidence concludes that the allies were aware of Auschwitz Birkenau to quite a large extent but the question regarding their course of action remains. And the dilemma can seemingly be boiled down to the question of whether the allies should have prioritised a moral high ground over the pragmatic approach they actually took. Conclusively, it appears that they made the right decision, and benefited more by deciding to refrain from bombing, despite the Auschwitz escapees impassioned pleas. Due to the uncertainty of whether an attack would be successful or not, and the provoking nature of the operation, it is understandable that it was ruled out. Provoking the nazis in such a way could lead to them taking extreme measures in retaliation; such as speeding up the murder process, and ultimately making the war even more tension-filled. Instead the allies decided to bring rescue through victory, and did so successfully, shortly after the reports of the death camp spread. By looking at the context of the bombing debate the decision made was can also be