Analysis Of George Nagel's Argument Against The Existence Of God

Hume (textbook, p. 305) develops, in detail, what is presumably the most grounded contention against the presence of God in a valid deductive argument. He states, “Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence then is evil?” In a similar vein: If God exists, he is all-knowing, omnipotent, and ethically flawless. If God were all-knowing, God would know about all the terrible occasions that occur in our reality. If God were omnipotent, God would have the capacity to do something. Furthermore, if God were ethically flawless, then unquestionably God would want to do something about all the evil and suffering. But, yet there are still countless instances of evil that fills our world. Concluding, since God does not prevent or eliminate all unnecessary suffering, logically, God does not exist. Hume concludes that if you want to make sense of all the evil randomness of the universe with the sense of God’s attributes, “You must prove these pure, unmixed, and uncontrollable attributes from the present mixed and confused phenomena, and from these alone. A hopeful undertaking!”

247) considers two solutions proposed for Hume’s argument. He writes, “One way that is frequently used is to maintain that what is commonly called evil is only an illusion, or at worst only the ‘privation’ or absence of good.” Nagel disassembles this proposition, noting in any case the suffering and misery are real; thus, this argument is insensitive to human suffering. The second proposal is, “the things called evil are evil only because they are view in isolation; they are not evil when viewed in proper perspective and in relation to the rest of creation.” Nagel concludes, if this is true, what specifically is the greater good? It is not sufficient to state some great may come about because of