In Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant explains how humans should act if they want to live morally. Kant is worried about moral means to ends without the ends themselves. On Liberty by J.S. Mill is different in that Mill regards individuals, either minority or majority, in a society and the requirements for one person to limit the liberty of another. Mill is worried about social outcomes instead of just the intention behind actions. While these two philosophers differ in their approach on how we can live a good life, they would tend to agree on their understanding of the moral right choice and wrong. One such moral choice is the question of whether the pursuit of scientific knowledge ought to be constrained by concern for …show more content…
For the most part, Mill lets people do whatever they want, as he believes people should express what they want to, how they want to. There is one strict exception to this general rule though, and it is the harm principle. This principle states that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Liberty 9). This translates to a person can only limit the expression and desires of another person, against their will, if it is to prevent harm. Throughout history people have dedicated their lives towards the pursuit of science, towards pushing humanity further. Because of science, we have cured once fatal diseases, survived in the extremest conditions, in or out of nature, and understand the world around us. The harm done would not only be towards the expression of the individuals who want to understand the world, but to the world as we could not advance any further as a race if we remain stagnant in our understanding of …show more content…
Moral concepts “have their seat and origin completely a priori in reason, and indeed in the most ordinary human reason as much in the most highly speculative” (Grounding 411). This explains how moral concepts are founded and have their origin completely in a “priori in reason” or carefully founded in reason, and solely reason, with no prior experience being relied on to make the moral law. With this purity “of their origin lies their very worthiness to serve us as supreme practical principles” (Grounding 411). Essentially, the purity of the moral principles, being founded in complete reason, is the very worthiness that allows us to follow them as our moral principles. If we were to constrain scientific knowledge, this decision would not be made out of reason because of how illogical it is. The decision would be made based off of experience and worry, which would detract from its worthiness to follow as well as the concern the law makers would have of societal good, preventing the careful consideration that would be required to limit genetic modifications. The issue with laws being made out of experience rather than solely reason, is that if we were to extend “that something empirical is added to them, just so much is taken away from their genuine