Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation One year before the American Civil War came to an end President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation. Not only was the Proclamation a stepping stone for civil rights, but it was a strategic military measure. The Proclamation freed slaves in the confederate states in order to cripple the Confederacy while maintaining good relations with the boarder slave states loyal to the Union (McPherson, 557). The Proclamation was significant for Union strategy because it made it legal for blacks to enlist in the Union Forces (McPherson, 563), giving a strategic advantage to the Union to have more troops. By the end of the war blacks made up nearly 12% of Union forces, which was equivalent to the entire …show more content…
The Proclamation gives a “limited role for black soldiers ‘to garrison forts, positions, stations and other places’” limiting uses on the front lines, yet this was not the case in practice (McPherson, 564). Additionally, the Emancipation Proclamation created a new purpose and objective for the Union. Prior to the Proclamation the Union focused on the protection and preservation of the Union. The Proclamation turned “Union forces into armies of liberation” and freedom of slaves (McPherson, 558). Consequentially, European support began to shift. Europe initially supported the Confederacy for trade purposes, but by changing the objective of the Union, European states changed their stance in favor of their abolitionist leanings. Lastly, it is curious what the future of the United States would be if the Confederacy heeded Lincoln’s warning in 1962 that this proclamation would be given and quit, then they may have been able to keep slaves, but since they did not, the President kept to his …show more content…
In 1914 it was implemented by Colonel-General Helmuth von Molke. It was intended to be a response to a two front war, but due inaccurate assumptions and miscalculations of implementation the Schlieffen Plan was a failure. The German army failed to go south and east of Paris, which was the original plan. The two armies that were supposed to go South and west were then North West of Paris pushing the armies too close together resulting in a stalemate which produced trench warfare. One of Germany’s inaccurate assumptions was that Belgium will not fight in response to the invasion. Additionally, Germany did not account for a response from Great Britain. Germany did not have the logisitical flexibility to address the entrance of these actors into their plan. The German Economy was not strong enough to support the extensiveness of the plan. The biggest implication of the plan is that in its adoption “Germany encouraged the newly emerged system of competing associates and guaranteed that a war between any two states would embroil them” (Kagan, 167), and that the need to fight two fronts and the invasion of Belgium, German mobilization would guarantee a European