How Did Mg Roy Urquhart's Acquisition Of Mission Command

The Battle of Arnhem in September of 1944 was a seminal event in the development of mission command within the ranks of the British Army. It also serves as a unique learning point for leaders of all Armies today in how mission command must be dynamic and commanders must adapt their leadership styles for each new challenge. This paper will explore the shortcomings of MG Roy Urquhart, the British 1st Airborne Division commander, during the battle. Specifically it will address the failure to build a cohesive team through mutual trust, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative and create a shared understanding.
To understand why Arnhem developed like it did, we must first look at the lead up and situation on the western front at the time. Arnhem came three months after the Allied invasion on D-Day during Operation Overlord. During this time, the allies had vast success in the breakout from Normandy. They swiftly moved across France in a massive frontal assault and liberated Paris in just two months. As the allies reached the German border, the assault stalled as they encountered one final,

During this time, the other two brigades continued attempts at achieving their objectives of establishing a defensive perimeter around the city. They never understood that one battalion had found a route to their objective and were too rigid to understand that the bridge must be captured first for the defensive perimeter to matter. Without the commanding general there to help overcome this lack of shared understand and without him providing a clear commanders intent prior to the assault, the bridge was never given priority and thus was never captured. The Germans subsequently used it over the coming days to significantly reinforce their counter