Operation Anaconda Case Study Using Mission Command Principles

Accessing Operation Anaconda Case Study Using Mission Command Principles
Operation Anaconda was a very pivotal moment for the conflict in Afghanistan and how the American Military structured itself. In the process of learning lessons about the importance of using mission command principles when conducting large-scale operations, the American Military made significant changes to the way they conduct large-scale operations. The operation has several elements that are both good and bad for every Soldier to learn from and understand. Using the mission command principles commanders’ intent, mutual trust, and disciplined initiative. I will analyze what went right, wrong, and what could have been prevented in the 17-day operation.
Commanders Intent

Cutting off all escape routes while more troops went into the valley to capture, kill, and force a retreat was the desired outcome. The assets used were light infantry, air assault, a few aerial assets, SOF units, and allied ground forces. It would have been possible to achieve this objective on the initial push if all assets had been placed at the disposal of the US Tactical Commander, MG Franklin Hagenbeck. The capabilities, size, and location of the enemy force where underestimated causing the initial plan to fail drastically with little course of action for a new plan. During the initial planning of the operation the unit commanders should have raised more concern about the lack of a backup plan if something should fail, the lack of known intelligence about the valley and its occupants, and the lack of equipment and resources. History warned us that the valley was easy to defend with its high mountains, caves, valleys, and other naturally protected locations for enemy fighters to establish positions capable of engaging the valley floor and access routes with gunfire (Kugler,

He knew his mission and the possibilities that could arise, yet he did not gain control over the air components or the allied troops. This is a huge shortcoming for this operation because other entity commands may understand the operation and their purpose differently than that of MG Hagenbeck.
Using forces from Afghanistan was a great concept for MG Hagenbeck because this should lower the overall uneasiness of the enemy. Not only does it show that Americans wanted Afghan residences to control their own country, but it showed that they were trusted to do so. “Operations to consolidate gains make temporary operational successes enduring and se the conditions to facilitate the transition of control over territory to legitimate authorities” (Army, 2019). The trust was there for the local fighters to stand their ground and perform their duties, however should have been assessed greater due to Zia Lodin’s troops only training for two weeks with the American forces and had not worked a large operation before. To eliminate this and continue mutual trust between the two assets they should have integrated more American or allied forces with them during the operation. This may have influenced the importance of Lodin’s forces and prevented the retreat leading to the mission going as initially