Principles Of Mission Command: Operation Anaconda.
SSG Alicea-Sevilla, Manuel
Army Sustainment University
SLC: 91/94 CMF Class 23-024
SFC Hercules & Mr. Burger
Date:20230428
Introduction/Abstract
The essay analyzes the application of the seven command principles by the United States military during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2002. Primarily, an analysis on General Hagenbeck's operational leadership and decision-making through the lens of the seven command principles to evaluate the extent to which he adhered to them. The analysis of the outcomes of Operation Anaconda is presented, along with identifying additional contributing factors that facilitated its achievement. Discussions have arisen regarding the advantages of implementing
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The disciplined initiative was vital in Operation Anaconda because it enabled troops to make critical decisions and act rapidly in fast-paced and uncertain situations (Kugler, 2007). General Hagenbeck gave his men authority if they adhered to the mission's overarching goals and the commander's intentions. Despite tremendous obstacles, the troops responded quickly and successfully finished the operation.
Risk Acceptance
The principle of risk acceptance highlights the significance of limiting risks that are not necessarily necessary to achieve mission objectives. Risk acceptance was critical in Operation Anaconda, allowing the troops to fulfill their goals with the least risk. General Hagenbeck and his subordinates took risks to accomplish the mission's goals but avoided those that were not essential (Kugler, 2007). It allowed the soldiers to fulfill their mission objectives while reducing losses in a fluid and unexpected
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The mission's success is due to the troops' enhanced ability to socialize, trust one another, and take disciplined initiative. In other cases, however, the principles were only partially applied, resulting in chaos, anarchy, and competing goals. General Hagenbeck's leadership and judgment were crucial
References
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Greentree, T. (2021). What went wrong in Afghanistan? The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, 51(4), 7–22. https://doi.org/10.55540/0031-1723.3088
Kugler, R. (2007). Operation anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study of Adaptation in Battle. Case Studies in Defense Transformation Number 5. Retrieved April 28, 2023, from https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA463075.pdf
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