Immanuel Kant Against Animal Rights

For this experiment, I choose the issue of animal rights. It’s my considered opinion that the ethical attitude to animals is inseparable from the fundamental moral values. David A. Nibert points out in his article Animal Rights and Human Social Issues, that “Immanuel Kant … recognized the relationship between people 's callous treatment of animals and their treatment of each other” (1994, p. 115). Probably, someone would ask me, “What are you talking about? We face today many social problems: drugs, terrorism, poverty, diseases, environmental pollution, child abuse, and so on. Is the issue of animal rights so important to you?” I will answer affirmatively, because, undoubtedly, our attitude toward animals is the mirror of our inner world.

My

To the same extent, I think that the academic articles of the animal rights supporters are much more informative and persuasive than the publications of their opponents. On the other hand, I want to stay impartial and objective. Therefore, I have to admit that many works of the critics of animal rights are extremely insightful and interesting, though disputable. For instance, Jan Narveson in his work A Case against Animal Rights, states, “There are, of course, other extremely impressive animal skills one can point to. The singular homing abilities of some species, for instance, the incredible mechanisms for self-defense or attack, the astonishing (in human terms) capacity for self-sacrifice displayed by ants and bees, and so on. All these are certainly enough to intrigue even the most minimally curious among us. But do they provide support for the view that these beings have moral rights?” (1986/87, p.192-193)

This article highlights irreconcilable conflict between the two sides. Jan Narveson addresses Tom Regan, the author of The Case for Animal Rights, “he in the preceding argument, refers to just anybody who doesn 't already accept whatever moral principle we are trying to establish. This does raise a question just who "anybody" is here. For present purposes, I think, it is any member of the class of moral agents whose actions we think are properly subject to the principle being advocated” (1986/87, p.