Ipremier Attack Case

IPremier did not perform well during the 75 minute attack. They lacked the proper procedures to manage this kind of situation. To be precise, they had a binder, but it is obsolete and out of date. Many people on the lists did not work at iPremier anymore. Even though the situation was handle professionally by many parties involved, including, CIO, CTO, legal counsel, and VP of business development, there was no communication plan and no attempt to pool knowledge. Each individual party tried to work individually and just add different suggestions. The iPremier’s analysis for this situation was pretty paralyzed. Even after Bob received many calls, Bob still had no idea how the situation exactly is, DoS or intrusion, until Joanne gained the access to Qdata. Furthermore, no one escalated the issue with Qdata that gave the hard time for Joanne to access to network operations center at Qdata. Fortunately, the attack was over by itself. If the attack had not ended like it did, and coupled with a possible intrusion, the consequences on iPremier would have been much more severe. IPremier might not have been able to stop it very soon because the

Although, in this case, Bob’s decision has seen to be correct because there is no loss during 75 minutes of the attack, there are risks that the information and data of iPremier would be hacked by the attacker. If we were Bob Turley, we would play safe by shutting down the system. The risks from losing customer’s information trend to outweigh the risks of losing some evidences of what has happen. Another thing we would do if I were Bob is trying to escalate Qdata. We absolutely do not ask Jack Samuelson, CEO of iPremier, to call someone at Qdata because that should be done immediately after Bob received the first call at 4:31 AM. Even though Bob have not had any Qdata contact information with him, he would rather call someone for the contact