Contradiction In Kant's Formulas Of Universal Law

outlook.’’ He critiques Kant’s thought by observing ‘‘every action explicitly calls for a particular content and a specific end, while duty as abstraction entails nothing of the kind.’’ (Hegel Philosophy of Right 134) Hegel contends that the only way Kant can possibly deduce a particular duty is if Kant already accepted certain existing moral opinions or customs as justifiable. For example, it is certainly a contradictory maxim to accept a deposit that is entrusted to me without planning to return it, but it is only contradictory, according to Hegel, if we first accept the notion of property. As regards Kant, he tries to give a pure justification of property, without considering the historical and social circumstances and their possible consequences,

She begins her discussion by categorizing the attempt to address the emptiness critique into three general categories, the Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation and the Practical Contradiction Interpretation. The Logical Contradiction is logically inconceivable that one will the maxim in a world in which the maxim is a universal law. The Teleological Contradiction is a contradiction in willing the maxim as a universal teleological law; making the maxim a universal law violates the very purpose that the maxim was supposed to serve. In the Practical Contradiction, if the maxim were a universal law, the maxim’s ability to achieve a desired purpose would be undermined; it would no longer serve your ends to act on such a maxim. I will discuss these interpretations individually and discuss the critiques that Korsgaard levies against the Logical Contradiction Interpretation as well as the Teleological Contradiction Interpretation. Finally, I intend to discuss the Practical Contradiction Interpretation and the claim Korsgaard makes regarding the connection of the Practical Contradiction Interpretation to actual actions, and how this can address

As such, she constructs a process of analysis that is based on two different, yet connected frameworks, conceptual and volitional contradictions. Conceptual contradictions note that the maxims in reference to contradictions tend to ignore the fundamental core of the maxim, that it is a principle of action, or a principle that we will. Much like Korsgaard’s Logical Contradiction Interpretation, the conceptual contradiction is based on analyzing whether the unsuccessful universalization of the maxim leading to a contradiction would fundamentally prevent the intent of the maxim from being realized; for example, if one posits the maxim that ‘one should break promises’, the universalization of this maxim would eliminate the practice of promises, preventing one from breaking promises. To this she adds a concept of volitional contradiction, volitional contradictions can be based on conceptually consistent maxims, but only if these maxims ignore the fundamental importance of willing. To will is to intend to make something occur, rather than just wishing it were the case, in which one analyzes whether the means, components and consequences of the universalization of the maxim would fundamentally