Moral Skepticism Vs Natural Law

Though its jurisprudential progeny (i.e.-- legal positivism and realism) are useful tools for analyzing positive law and legal reasoning, moral skepticism remains an intellectual threat to society, culture, and the legal system. Divorce of law from morality tends toward a relativism that undermines moral authority and tolerant of grave acts that natural law theorists can simply call “unjust” or “evil.”

Moral skepticism is inherently fallacious, premised by the ad ignorantiam that lack of evidence proves natural law does not exist or is unknowable. Further, absent a normative framework outside culture, the legitimacy of law and legal systems is based ad verecundiam upon the dictates, predilections, and whim of the sovereign. Liberty is merely

These acts violate each of our natural inclinations. We abhor the barbaric, brutal murder of innocent human life and the utter disregard for the preservation of humanity; we reject hate-filled propaganda dripping with lies, violating our desire for truth and knowledge; and we condemn the destruction of civil society. In short, we are repulsed by evil.

Skeptics argue that ISIS terrorists likewise act on inclinations for preservation of lives, “truth,” society, and their conception of “good.” Thus, natural law does not exist or is worthless. Yet, conscience can be disordered; free will coerced; and reason misguided. For Aquinas and Finnis, practical reason/reasonableness is not being applied properly. Plato, likewise, would argue that the head (reason) leads the well-formed soul, tempering the heart (greater passions), and disciplining the belly (appetite). Reason is not guiding the terrorist. Similarly, positive law can be unjust. For the naturalist, an unjust law is not law. For the positivist, law is law.

Radbruch observed that divorce of law and morality contributed to the relative ease with which the Nazis subverted the German system. Rejecting legal naturalism for moral skepticism logically mutes the cry against oppression, undermines the legitimacy of civil society, and ignores the quiet voice human

The case-specific consequences as adjudicated were minimal. Ms. Buck had notice, hearing, and the ability to appeal, and therefore due process was not violated. Furthermore, another “imbecile” would not be breeding, Her life would be all the better, and so would Virginia in the eyes of eugenics champions.

Systemically, the opinion weighed federalism and separation of powers issues, and concerned with the “division of labor” was deferential to state legislative authority. In terms of forward-looking adjudication, significant systemic consequences were likely had Ms. Buck won the case. To find for Ms. Buck, the Court would likely have expanded the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Expansion of due process would have been completely unreasonable for Holmes, as it would have meant extending “substantive due process,” after famously dissenting from ¨Lochner. Finally, Posner asserts, “Legal pragmatists are more sympathetic to rhetoric.” As jarring as the phrase is to the contemporary ear, one can still appreciate the rhetorical flourish of “Three generations of imbeciles are enough,” particularly one who states ““People are monkey with large brains,