Multi-Source Intelligence At General Hooker

Application of Multi-Source Intelligence

To the benefit of both sides, there were many forms of information collection available. According to Luvass (1990), “On the operational level, commanders still relied primarily on scouts and spies to provide them with the majority of the information they needed regarding the enemy” (p. 103). Sears (1996) pointed out that the cavalry was utilized by General Hooker not only for the scouting of “enemy locations and activity”, but for “terrain analysis” as well. Furthermore, according to Fishel (1996) Hooker’s spy network provided him with tactical and strategic reports for as long as battle field conditions permitted the collection and reporting of the information (pp. 360-362). Additionally, at this

Prior to arriving in Chancellorsville, Hooker had a clear understanding of the enemy. He knew who they were, where they were, and to some degree, their activities. Once he crossed the Rappahannock however, his scouts were too far south of his position to relay pertinent data and weather obscured the effectiveness of his aerial and signal assets. Consequently, he was unable to sustain the level of intelligence he relied on for planning throughout the rest of the

Others will argue that Lee’s impending assault could have failed and if Hooker had just fought a while longer, the tide could have turned. In retrospect, I agree with what Stackpole (1958) surmised, that the defeat could have likely been avoided if Hooker held more cavalry back during the attack to guard his flank (pp. 212-216). Furthermore, some of Hooker’s leading generals, to include General Howard, were ignorant on the ways of intelligence. According to Loncare (2005), a contributing factor to the operations failure was General Howard’s intelligence expectations. General Howard expected intelligence to flow from the top down. When he was presented with reporting from his pickets that the enemy was on his flank, he discounted them because the reports contradicted what he had previously received from higher (pp. 204-207). So, had Hooker maintained more cavalry on his flank and Howard trusted the intelligence of his own troops, the Army of the Potomac could have fended off the Confederate flanking maneuver. Through sheer force of numbers, they could have easily decimated the opposing force and thoroughly beaten back General Lee’s army. That series of actions would have solidified a Union victory at Chancellorsville and potentially deterred the Battle of Gettysburg from ever