Napoleon's Attacks

). One of the most important relationships that would determine the outcome of the crushing loss for the allied troops was between Napoleon and his leading Admiral, Pierre Villeneuve. The lack of partnership between these two men would shape the battle as Villeneuve would repeatedly ignore the unworkable orders sent directly from Napoleon’s central command (Adkins, 60). It was just days before the battle when Villeneuve became aware that Napoleon planed to replace him with Vice-Admiral Rosily (Adkins, 60). Only with this threat of being replaced, did the rogue Admiral leave Cadiz and finally engage Nelson’s fleet (Adkins, 60). The initial stubbornness of Napoleon’s most senior officer and the inadequate relationship between France and

Upon witnessing Napoleon’s tyrannical rule in 1793, the British government urgently began preparations to defend against a possible invasion (Adkins, 9). Such preparations included the fortification of existing structures along the South-East and East coasts, as well as the construction of a new development: The Martello towers (Adkins, 9). “In 1805, a programme of building was begun that in three years would result in 73 towers” (Adkins, 9). On top of this, Britain began digging a canal surrounding London that “could be used as a defensive ditch” in the event of a sudden French invasion (Adkins, 11). Even before the British had decided to confront their enemies at Trafalgar, Nelson exhibited remarkable planning and approach to the battle. Long before the battle, a blockade was set up on Nelson’s orders to trap numerous enemy ships at bay in the Spanish ports at Cadiz (Adkins, 13). This ploy proved both cunning and tactful, disallowing the trapped ships at bay from reinforcing Admiral Villeneuve at sea (Adkins, 17). Just before the battle, Nelson ordered his men to act on their own initiative so as not to delay action by waiting on his orders amidst the battle (Adkins, 101). This order would give the British a distinct advantage, as “the reliance on orders…proved a recurring weakness in the French and Spanish navies” who had to wait for instruction (Adkins, 126). These signals were often improperly interpreted or not received at all (Adkins, 126). In the midst of battle, Dumanoir, whose fleet was sailing away from the zones of combat, issued an order to suddenly turn back around (Adkins, 162). This order created mass confusion which resulted in the collision of several ships within the fleet (Adkins, 162). As a consequence of relentless