Operation Husky Mission Command And Integration

Operation Husky is a good case study of mission command and integration at the operational level. General Eisenhower and the Allied Headquarters performed subpar in exercising mission command and integrating service components during Operation Husky. The planning phase of Operation Husky highlighted a lack of mission command. The planning process lacked commander’s intent, understanding, and mutual trust. The operational phase of Operation Husky showed some integration of fires; and little integration movement and maneuver. Each service component acted mostly independent of each other. Furthermore, there was almost no integration of movement and maneuver within the land component, the Fifteenth Army Group. Nevertheless, Operation Husky provided important experiences and lessons to the Allies for the upcoming invasion of France.
The three attributes of mission command are commander’s intent, understanding, and mutual trust. A lack of clarity in the strategic realm had adverse impacts at the

In a multination operation, the “command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements.” Although Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander for the operation, his command authority as practiced in the American military did not exist. The operation utilized the British system of “autonomous service commanders.” There were three service component commanders – land, sea, and air – that acted almost independently during the planning and execution of the operation. They did not seek Eisenhower’s intent. They also did not coordinate with each other. The command structure made it all but impossible for Eisenhower to actualize his intent for the operation nor did he tried to act as the commander for the operation. The Land Component commander, General Sir Alexander, also did not convey his intent to his subordinate