Operation Jubilee Case Study

Operation Jubilee was the raid into Dieppe, France on August 19, 1942. The raid was comprised of six thousand Soldiers and Marines supported by an additional four thousand Sailors and Airmen. The operation was carried out by three separate ‘Force Commanders,’ Rear Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman, Air Vice-Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory, and Major General Hamilton Roberts. Each commander directed his respective sea, air, or land service. The raid was to be conducted in four phases: Commandos would destroy coastal batteries on the furthest flanks of the beach. 2. A secondary force would attack the beachheads that overlooked Dieppe Beach. 3. The ground forces would conduct a frontal attack on the beaches. 4. Lastly, all forces would retrograde

ADRP 6-0 states, “Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.” Effective mission command enables mission success. However, ineffective mission command can dismantle a well-designed plan. Major General Roberts failed to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. Roberts’ oversight in establishing these mission command principles led to the failure of the mission and the death of thousands of men. Roberts did not build cohesive teams through mutual trust with his fellow commanders. Operation Jubilee was a massive military undertaking requiring the coordination of thousands of service members. “Uniting all the diverse capabilities necessary to achieve success in operations requires collaborative and cooperative efforts that focus those capabilities toward a common goal.” However,

Mission orders are utilized by commanders to delineate the end state of a mission through broad guidance. It is not used to direct subordinates on how to achieve the objectives. War is not a static phenomenon, but is rather dynamic. Plans need flexibility to allow subordinate commanders the adaptability necessary to adjust as the enemy reacts. In a report prepared for Canadian High Command after the raid, Roberts stated, “Plans were not flexible. All but one BN were put in in [sic] the initial assault.” The mission depended on the success of every phase of the raid in order for the frontal assault on the beach to be successful. There could be no deviation from the plan. During the assault onto the eastern headlands at Puys, Roberts demonstrated his inability to use mission orders. The assault had called for either heavy bombardment, or the cover of darkness in order to achieve success. When neither could be achieved, the mission should have been called off. Lieutenant Colonel Catto was the commander of the battalion assaulting Puys. Catto requested a heavy bombardment in order to clear any barbed wire on the beaches. He knew from his experience in World War I that the Germans had always laid heavy wire around their defenses. Roberts stated there did not appear to be any wire on the beaches, and that if Catto was afraid to lead his men, he would be replaced. By