Operational Art Vietnam War

In 1986, Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations introduced the term operational art to the United States Army. Operational art defined the planning and employment of joint military forces into a theater to accomplish a strategic aim by military means – the act of linking the phenomena of war and warfare. Operational art is an abstract process that uses theory, historical patterns, and an understanding of the operational environment to fill gaps in knowledge to plan and execute operations. It does not contain a structured framework like the Military Decision Making Process. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0 Unified Land Operations, the Army’s most recent doctrine, defines operational art as “the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs – supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment – to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces.” This definition accurately describes quintessential aspects of operational art – the planning and employment of forces – but does not describe the role of policy in operational art. The concept of operational art, as defined in ADRP 3-0, fails to portray two fundamental aspects of

The American people’s unwillingness to accept the continued loss of human life with no clear end caused the United States to change its policy regarding offensive operations – which were thought to be more prone to producing casualties. The new policy focused on withdrawing United States forces and limiting offensive operations. This change to policy had an effect on the nature of warfare in Vietnam. When military leaders did not acknowledge changes to United States policy it resulted in the Battle of Fire Support Base (FSB) Ripcord – a heroic effort by the 101st Airborne Division, but ultimately a loss of life for no potential change in the outcome of the