Outlines Of Pyrrhonism By Sextus Empericus

In Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empericus gives a general account of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Of particular interest is its take on the notion of inquiry; although the dogmatists agree that inquiry is possible they argue that Skeptics cannot inquire into the things they discuss. This essay will explain in detail how Sextus Empericus counters the argument brought forward by the dogmatists concerning the inability of Skeptics to inquire. I will begin by exploring the dogmatists’ argument. The skeptic is unable to investigate or form any sort of conception of their dogmatic views. (III 31 1) This is their conclusion. The first premise is that if the Skeptic grasps what the dogmatist says, he cannot be in doubt about what he has grasped. The second is that if the skeptic does not grasp what the dogmatist says, he will not even be able to talk about what he has grasped. (III 31 2-3) This claim made by the dogmatists is a variant of Meno’s Paradox.

Important to note before going forward are three outcomes to an inquiry believed to exist by the Skeptics, which are discovery, denial of the possibility of discovery and continued inquiry. The Skeptics have identified that the discovery and denial of the possibility of discovery are what the dogmatists are interested in when it comes to an inquiry. Sextus did not dispute the validity of the dogmatists’ argument. He considers that ‘grasp’ as used by the dogmatists could mean two things. The first being it could simply mean conceiving things. And the second meaning to posit the existence of things made. (III 31