Quine's Holism

Argument in Support of Quine’s Holism In “Two-Dogmas of Empiricism,” W.V. Quine argues that the analytic and synthetic distinction in Epistemology is false. He presents the view that beliefs do not exist independently of each other; instead, our beliefs form an interconnected web. In Quine’s view, all beliefs within this web of knowledge are revisable if we make sufficient changes in other parts of the system. Thus, for Quine’s version of Holism to be true, all beliefs must be revisable. Analytic knowledge is non-revisable. Therefore, if Quine’s Holism is true, no statement is analytic. In this paper, I will consider, and then reject, a version of Holism that allows for non-revisable analytic statements. I will then argue that any reasonable

To do this, Quine systematically demonstrates that the conception of analytic statements is ambiguous. He says a statement is analytic when “it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact” (Quine 1). By independently of fact, Quine means that analytic statements do not depend on any empirical knowledge of the world. Quine concludes the term “meanings” does not refer to any object in the world. Quine then turns to statements philosophers claim are analytic. He divides these statements into two classes. The first class he calls logical truths. He defines these as “statement[s] which [are] true and remain true under all reinterpretations of [their] components other than the logical particles” (Quine 2). The identifying characteristic of these statements is the interchangeability of non-logical particles. Assuming the logical particles remain any substitution of the remaining words will result in the statement remaining true. The second class of analytic statements he does not name. However, he states that the “characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms” (Quine 2). He gives the following example: “No bachelor is married” (Quine 2). If we substitute the term “bachelor” for “unmarried man,” then the resulting statement, “no unmarried man is married,” represents an analytic statements of the first

Quine offers no argument against the existence of these analytic statements; he argues only against synonymy as a sufficient explanation for the second class of analytic statements. Further, and more to the point, these logical truths are exactly the type of knowledge that is non-revisable. Take for example the statement, “no unmarried man is married.” Intuitively, this statement seems necessarily true. The inversion of the statement leads to an absurd contradiction: “all (or some) unmarried men are married.” Logically true statements appear to be