Ricky Smith Case

Ricky Franklin Smith was charged (as an adult) with breaking and entering a building with intents to commit larceny. Smith acknowledged that he had broken a window of a warehouse Pontiac, entered the building, and removed property without permission. Therefore Smith was sentenced to three and one-half to ten years for breaking and entering as a first time offender. But that sentence was vacated and Smith was sentenced to serve six to thirty years as a habitual offender (this was his fourth offense). Smith filed an appeal for improper sentencing because he cited that presentencing court judge used his juvenile record to characterize him as a “habitual offender” and a “danger to society”. Moreover, Smith argued that the judge couldn’t use a juvenile

Smith had been charged with assault and battery which ended in dismissal. Then he was placed on probation for school truancy, during this time Smith was found driving a stolen vehicle. Shortly, after this incident probation was continued when he was cited for riding a bicycle while under the influence of alcohol and for stealing candy bars. Again Smith’s probation was continued when he was charged with larceny and carrying a knife. Smith was also stopped for violating a curfew and threaten an officer with a knife. Prosecutors asked the court for a waiver to adult court and that request was denied after an alleged attack on a woman. After the denial, Smith was sentenced to a Boy’s Training School and which he ran away after three

Moreover, Smith cited that he was improperly sentenced on the basis of a presentence investigation report containing his “expunged juvenile record”. Which made Smith’s adult record inaccurate under MCR 5.913.[5] ( Michigan Court Rules). In People v McFarlin, (1973), this Court held that a sentencing judge could properly consider an adult offender's juvenile offense record although the Probate Code provided that a disposition of a child by a probate; court shall not be proper evidence against the child for "any purpose whatever" in any civil, criminal, or other cause except in a case against the child under the Juveniles and Juvenile Division Chapter of the Probate Code. When McFarlin was decided, the court rules did not provide for expungement of records. In 1978, this Court adopted this amended, provided for the automatic expungement of the records of a juvenile offender if, after the seventh year following the discharge of the child from the court's jurisdiction, there has been no subsequent felony conviction. Therefore, the rule in effect at the time Smith was sentenced, replaced shortly after the adoption of this rule, it provides that a juvenile court judge may not set aside a conviction of a juvenile offense which if committed by an adult would be a felony for which the maximum punishment is life imprisonment or an