Role Functionalism Analysis

In order to determine the relevant distinction between Role Functionalism and Realizer Functionalism, one needs to derive a concise description of what the functionalism theory entails. Functionalism is a theory about the nature of mental states. It became prominent during the 1960s and widely accepted in relation to its views which deemed plausible for many other sciences. In the philosophy of mind, it is the components of “a mental state of a particular type” which “does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part” (Levin 2013). Functionalism is a theory seen rooted in Aristotle’s work in ‘Conception of the Soul’, and also a forbearer in that of Hobbes

In this, Pelman distinguishes how Lewis’ made a powerful case of identifying mental states with physical states, however, a dispute arose as Kripke’s views challenged this identification. In order to settle the dispute Putnam simmered down their views to whether pain is rigid or non-rigid by Lewis view of pain as being non rigid and Kripke’s view of pain as rigid. Lewis being the originator of Analytic Functionalism alongside Armstrong, used this funtionalism to identify the mental states with physical states. This was achieved in two stages. Firstly, what makes something a state is by the causal role it plays. For example pain is a state that is a caused by bodily injury, while the mental state is identified by its functional roles for example the c-fibre firing. However this distinction makes Lewis analytical functionalism a type of realizer functionalism as it identifies mental states with the realisers of the functional roles and only deals with the internal elements of the mental states. In this case using the example pain and C-fibres, Pain would be the role functionalism while the c-fibres are the realizer functionalism. As pain can be exhibited differently through for example, fibre x, y, or z, but at the end of the day it is still registered as being a person being in pain. In terms of Kripkes alleged rigitedness, it is due to the fact that he associates the word pain in conclution that it equals c-fibres which Lewis was refusing to accept, hence believing that pain is non-rigid. For example, if pain were to be rigid to the C-fibres, then pain cant be distinctive to another type of fibre, example D, as from Kriptes argument D is isn’t pain. However, if C and D occupy the same pain role, meaning they are