Schuman Plan

The following paper will reveal how the United States responded to the Schuman Plan and further discusses the respond to it. In the following paragraphs I will emphasis on the reasoning of the US government. As a matter of fact, the US is a diverse and highly populated country. Thus, the reasoning of the general public will be left out because it is outside the limits of this paper. For the analysis, I will make use primary and secondary sources. To receive reliable and credible insights, the documents used are mainly telegrams to or from Acheson, who was from 1945-1953 the US Secretary of State and an important figure of US foreign affairs. To guarantee the representativeness of the sources the elected documents are from a different time after

702). At that time Harrison was a major senior foreign policy advisor who was respected by Acheson (Isaacson & Thomas, 1997). The primary source is from May 20th 1950 after the US reflected on the Schuman plan. The document states “overriding importance that this opportunity be not lost and that US throw full weight its support for prompt initiation and consummation of negotiations” (Bernbaum, 1950, p. 704). The quote clearly shows an optimistic stance towards the plans. Like the document analysed previously, the telegram lists reasons for the support of the Schuman plan because it is an “important step towards economic progress and peace of Europe” (Bernbaum, 1950, pp. 704). Thus, although the plan was a foreign policy matter, the success of the proposal was perceived as an important priority. Henceforth, after assessing the second primary source, it appears that the US motivation was generally driven to strive for prosperity and peace in Europe. However, after assessing the first sources we did not get answer provided to the question why the US was backing the Schuman plan. In the next step, to find an answer to the question, the analysis will concentrate on earlier documents, right after the Schuman declaration was

The overall response to the Schuman plan was relatively positive. The US main motivation was the want for a stable western Europe and the prevention of further wars. A strong integrated Western Europe should counter Soviet Russia. Withal, taking secondary sources into consideration, helped the analysis to widen its scope and the phrasing of primary sources. For further studies, it would be fruitful to have a closer look at further documents from the US administration beyond of Acheson and Webb, to achieve more credibility, and emphasis on the attitude of the general public in the