B. The Sixth, Second, And D.C. Circuits Adhere To A Less Deferential Application
Under Jackson, the Sixth, Second, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a less deferential standard in contrast to the Fifth, Ninth, and Third Circuits discussed above.
For instance, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Sliwo illustrates its differing application of Jackson to sufficiency challenges under the identical charges as with Rubio. United States v. Sliwo, 620 F.3d 630 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sliwo case also highlights the important consequence of the differing application under Jackson: it reversed the defendant’s convictions instead of affirming them as the Fifth Circuit did with Rubio.
In Sliwo, the Sixth Circuit highlighted the “extremely deferential standard” cited by the other circuits of upholding “a jury verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. It then qualified this understanding by noting that
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Circuit’s decision in United States v. Teffera, highlights the conflict on this same issue in another circuit involving the same type of case and sufficiency challenges. 985 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Converse to the Fifth Circuit, however, the D.C. Circuit indeed fulfilled its obligation to ensure a defendant’s due process rights were not violated by reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence in that case when challenged on review. Id. at 1082-83.
As to the aiding and abetting counts, the D.C. Circuit noted that the defendant’s actions of supplying false answers to the police and other actions of traveling away from another defendant reinforced the knowledge that the other person had illegal drugs. Id. at 1086. In Teffera, the court noted that among other things there are innumerable reasons why someone engages in the actions that they do, but a general web of inferences is too weak as a legal standard to uphold a conviction based on aiding and abetting. Id. at