Suicide Terrorism Strategy

Suicide Terrorism as a Tactic and Strategy

Introduction

Suicide attacks have developed as a unique socio-political phenomenon, particularly over the past three decades. They have occurred in settings of insurgency, civil war, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism (Acosta & Childs 2013, p. 49). Terrorist organisations are increasingly using suicide attacks as a strategy, and as a tactic, to accomplish political and social objectives (Pape 2003, p. 343). Suicide terrorism is distinguished from other forms of terrorism because the attacker does not expect to survive the attack. Essentially, the attacker kills their target, or targets, at the same time as they kill themself (Pape 2003, p. 345). This is done through means such as, bombings, assassinations,

Since 1982, a fractional list of terrorist organisations using suicide terrorism includes “al-Qaida, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), PKK, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Lashkar-e-Taiba” (Rosendorff & Sandler 2010, p. 444). More than thirty-five states on every continent, except for Antarctica and Australia, have experienced the devastation caused by suicide terrorism. In the past ten years, suicide attacks have occurred not only in an increasing number of states, but this tactic has been used by an even greater number of terrorist organisations (Moghadam, 2008, p. 46). These organisations are discovering their value in causing disruptive and lethal effects and their strategic value in achieving larger campaign goals (Atran 2004, p. 68). Terrorist organisations have two types of goals: process goals and outcome goals. Process goals are intended to ensure the group’s survival by achieving financial support, attracting the attention of the media, and enticing recruitment. The outcome goals of terrorist organisations are their stated political ends (Abrahams 2012, p. 367). Suicide attacks can be useful for terrorist organisations to achieve both of these

Suicide attacks provide organisations with a cost-effective way of intimidating a target, and increasing the costs of noncompliance with their demands (Hoffman & McCormick 2004, p. 249). Terrorist organisations that use suicide attacks are better positioned to increase the fear and expectations regarding escalating costs because they intentionally breach the norms in their use of violence. They do this by violating taboos regarding legitimate targets, and by using violence that causes excess damage. The element of suicide also helps to increase the image of a strong organisation by inferring that the attackers cannot be deterred (Pape 2003, p. 347). The attacks convey to the target that violence will continue and retaliatory attacks cannot dissuade the organisation. They give the perception that it would be more beneficial for the target to give in to their demands, rather than hope that they can or eliminate the group in the future (Asthappan 2010, p. 18). This was perhaps the most apparent in the American and French withdrawal from Beirut in 1983. Hezbollah’s truck bombings of the US Marine Barracks and the French Paratroopers’ sleeping quarters lead to the American and French military forces abandoning Lebanon, as demanded by the terrorist organisation (Rosendorff & Sandler 2010, p. 444; Santifort-Jordan & Sandler 2014, p. 981). President Ronald Regan later