Introduction
The Heart of Atlanta Motel challenged the constitutionality of this provision and, after losing before a three-judge federal court, appealed to the Supreme Court. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited places of “public accommodation” from discrimination based on the customers race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to enact the prohibitions on discrimination contained in the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Justice Thomas Clark wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. He reviewed testimony presented at congressional hearings showing that Americans had become increasingly mobile, but that African Americans
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One need only examine the evidence which we have discussed above to see that Congress may as it has prohibit racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however local their operations may appear." Justice Clark also found that the Act did not deprive the motel owner of liberty or property under the Fifth Amendment. Because Congress has the right to prohibit discrimination in accommodations under the Interstate Commerce Act, the motel “has no 'right' to select its guests as it sees fit, free from governmental …show more content…
People of all ethnicities are coming in from different states putting motels in the position of needing to adhere to federal and congressional law. Most commerce has interstate properties forcing them to comply with federal regulation whether it be traveling persons, out of state advertising, import/export or outsourcing making purely local commerce almost a untrue. The clause is often paired with the Necessary and Proper Clause, the combination used to take a broad, expansive perspective of powers granted to Congress by the Commerce Clause. Dispute exists within the courts as to the range of these powers however; the effect of the Commerce Clause has varied significantly depending on the Supreme Court's interpretation. During the Marshall Court era, Commerce Clause interpretation empowered Congress to gain jurisdiction over numerous aspects of intrastate and interstate commerce as well as non-commerce. During the post-1937 era, the use of the Commerce Clause by Congress to authorize federal control of economic matters became effectively unlimited. Since the latter half of the Rehnquist Court era, Congressional use of the Commerce Clause has become slightly restricted again, being limited only to matters of trade (whether interstate or not) and production (whether commercial or not). Rational basis review begins with establishing the factual predicate upon which the exercise of