The Contra War In Nicaragua

From 1981 to 1988 the Contra war took place in Nicaragua. The outbreak of the war began with several rebellions that were against the Sandinistas who had previously overthrown the Samoza regime. The Contra rebel group were not a homogenous one-sided group of people, instead they were a cumulation of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society: a group of republican former guard members from the old Somoza regime, individuals who were anti-Somozistas who felt deluded and betrayed by their government, and the third group were Nicaraguans that opposed the Sandinistas even though they were not considered to be directly involved in the revolution. The Reagan administration viewed these rebels as a “convenient tool” in order to “remove the Sandinistas

However, Nicaragua’s claim in the International Court of Justice that the contras were altogether a creation of the U.S was rejected . Although it is true, the U.S were not directly responsible for creating the rebel group, nonetheless, there is incontrovertible evidence proving close relationship between the U.S and the rebel group. “The U.S. played a significant role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras,” and the Contras were only became capable of carrying out significant military operations as a result of this support. The CIA supported the Contras by subsidizing, a supplying arms, and training them in combat. According to the Reagan administration, these efforts were produced to help democratic leaderships and associations to manage the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) administration from a position of power. The U.S trusted that the democratic Nicaraguans would center paramilitary operations against the Cuban presence in Nicaragua, alongside other socialist or communist groups, and utilize them as an encouraging point for the dissent components of the Sandinista military

In the investigation, it found that "the allegations […]were exaggerations of the actual facts." After examining the investigations and prosecutions of the main figures in the series, Blandón, Meneses and Ross, it concluded: "Although the investigations suffered from various problems of communication and coordination, their successes and failures were determined by the normal dynamics that affect the success of scores of investigations of high-level drug traffickers … These factors, rather than anything as spectacular as a systematic effort by the CIA or any other intelligence agency to protect the drug trafficking activities of Contra supporters, determined what occurred in the cases we