Understanding the Mind-Body Problem, simply by Explaining Consciousness In this paper, I intend to gloss over a quick explanation of the mind-body problem, and its greatest proponent; Rene Descartes, then focusing on a theory of consciousness, namely, Daniel Dennett’s Multiple Drafts Model, I will identify central aspects of his thesis, to combat directly against Cartesian notions and in doing so, illuminate and argue for a potential solution to the mind-body problem, which is the same position I hold.
The Gloss The mind-body problem exists in our inability to explain the relationship between physical and mental states, given the body is tangible and the mind is not. Whether or not the mind controls the brain, the brain controls the mind,
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For instance, Chalmers (1996) insists that Dennett discounts the part of consciousness any theory of consciousness needs to explain. This phantom residue deemed unaccounted for by the telo-functionalist model is the notorious qualia: the subjective seeming of experience, the what-it-is-like-ness (Nagal, 1974), or the ontological subjectivity (Searle, 1997). Qualia are the last bastion against a concrete physicalist theory of mind and thus the fodder for the following discussion. Zombies and …show more content…
Epiphenomenal qualia are particular interesting as they are theorized to be incapable of having any causal effect on the material world, unlike Descarte’s (1989) reciprocal interactionism; body can affect mind, but mind cannot affect body. Dennett (1991, pp. 401-406) responds such a concept by its own definition could never have any empirical support; suppose even if a subject somehow lost their epiphenomenal qualia, they wouldn’t be able to report it (as that would qualify as “affecting the material world”). However, whilst this thesis falls beyond the fray of Dennett’s method, that does not necessitate its impossibility. If we forego the idea that zombies are possible, we can then safely infer that beings who are physiologically similar, manifest similar experiences of the world, consequently, the counter-argument that relies upon the vanishing of epiphenomenal qualia has nowhere to stand. Dennett (1991, pp. 403-404) replies by asking us to consider 14 epiphenomenal-gremlins, all present in each cylinder of an internal combustion engine, in doing so, he pumps the verificationist intuition we ordinarily have around such unfalsifiable claims and insists we ought to treat this instance