Thomas Nagel's What Is It Like To Be A Bat

Constant efforts to imagine objectively restrict us, beings able to have conscious experience, from fully comprehending the notion of consciousness, thus our incomprehension of what it is like to be a bat stems from our inability to think subjectively and objectively. Thomas Nagel attempts to both define consciousness and differentiate subjectivity from objectivity by refuting reductive ontological views. I will argue that because any theory regarding the mind cannot disregard the intractable dilemma of subjectivity that is present in the study of consciousness Nagel is definitely entitled to his assumptions which he makes in “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” to invalidate reductionism. The premises that he utilizes involves what he refers to as “the subjective character of experience,” the flaws of physicalism, the inability to alter one’s fundamental structure, and the irreducible aspect of experience.

He begins by arguing that for an organism to have an experience there has to be something it is like to be that particular organism. He refers to that something as the “subjective character of experience.” Correspondingly, reductive theories about the mental are

Nagel contributes to the mind-body dualism by posing challenges to faulty reductive theories by discussing the importance of the consideration of subjectivity. He is entitled to the assumptions he makes because reductionism overlooks the gap between the subjective and the objective. Further exploring such gap can signify the creation of new methods that invoke the objective as well as the subjective. As of now the call for innovative approaches to understand the consciousness are essential to better understand our species and others