The Nixon And Carter Administrations Laid The Foundations Of Détente

The Nixon and Carter administrations laid the foundations of détente which would define U.S foreign policy during the 60s and early 70s. The change from containment to détente was due to the crisis and failure of containment in Vietnam among other factors which influenced subsequent administrations until Reagan to approach the Soviets in a more conciliatory manner. Based on the points Ambrose makes, Reagan had lofty goals of peace and arms limitation; but Ambrose almost exclusively highlighted failures and conduct that were mischievous (not unlike other presidents). As for Kissinger, he highlighted a more positive take on how Reagan was able to expedite the collapse of the Soviet Union and support fellow nations fighting against communism.

forces should intervene. During Reagan’s first term of being Commander in Chief, he separated himself from the administrations that came before him by criticizing Carter, Nixon, and Kissinger for allowing the Soviet Union achieve arms and strategic superiority. (Ambrose 303). Reagan believed that the movement from containment to détente deeply put the U.S. in a disadvantage. Détente dominated U.S. foreign policy which concentrated on accommodating the Soviets in the hopes that it would lead to arms and peace talks. Whether it was increased trade or an embargo on the Soviets, attempting to steer the Soviets to make deals in favor to the U.S. was not working; linkage was ineffective and only invited the Soviet Union to be more coercive and label the U.S. as weak. Early on Reagan’s inexperience was shown when he was unable to act against Soviet subversion against Solidarity, a legitimate Polish institution which was “moving Poland toward a genuine democracy.” (Ambrose 304). Although his prestige and power in the presidency was there, he was exposed early on to the reality of the Cold War. In the eyes of revisionists, Reagan was nothing more than a president in power at the time of Soviet

Along with the revival of confrontational containment, American exceptionalism was back at an all time high. The “guilt complex” which came from the two previous administrations which focused on détente was rejected fully by Reagan. (Kissinger 767). There was no need for the U.S. to be more accommodating to the Soviet Union if accommodation were to only be seen as a weakness. The arrival of Reagan meant that détente was on the way out and that the U.S. would no longer depend on linkage as a tool of good behavior. In terms of U.S. foreign policy, Reagan would now be questioned on how to apply a revitalized containment plan. When it came to dealing with the future relationship between the U.S. and the Soviets, Ambrose indicates how Reagan’s goals were not very different from any previous president. “Reagan’s goals were peace, limitations on the arms race, an actual reduction in the size of nuclear arsenals..” (Ambrose 320). The problem which Ambrose brought up were the means of attaining those goals. Reagan’s rhetoric was not necessarily conducive in making talks with the Soviet Union possible. Also known