The Pros And Cons Of North Korean Nuclear Testing

President Barack Obama had to deal with the North Korean nuclear testing around mid-2009. Sanctions were quickly adopted by the U.N. that banned arms transfers to and from the country. By the end of the year, Obama asked Kim Jong II to begin denuclearization talks but he didn’t really move towards pursuing them. In 2012, the new North Korean leader Kim Jong Un agreed to halt nuclear testing in exchange for food aid. Kim Jong Un is credited with accelerating the weapons program and under the Obama administration. () The Obama administration outlined the conditions before any diplomatic negotiations could occur but Kim Jong Un regime held fast to the idea that its nuclear program is necessary for defense. In 2014, North Korea threatens

North Korea is no longer pursuing nuclear capability; it is a nuclear-armed state. It has maybe 60 nuclear bombs already, ICBMs to put US mainland cities within range and the technology to miniaturize nuclear warheads for increased range. Premeditated military strikes by either side are unlikely triggers to a nuclear exchange. Instead, the fuse of an unwanted nuclear war could be lit by a fatal miscalculation in the instrumental recourse to brinksmanship by both sides. US threats could spook Kim into launching a preemptive attack if he fears an imminent US

Every observer of North Korea would agree that the chances of dealing successfully with the emerging threat have diminished considerably over the past eight years. Many would argue that achieving results is no longer possible and therefore the new administration should focus on other foreign policy and national security challenges. Nonetheless, the dangers to the United States and its allies posed by developments in North Korea are so great that Washington cannot afford to ignore this problem. In formulating a policy, the Trump administration should not fall into the same traps as past administrations. It must recognize not only the myths and misconceptions that can lead to failed approaches, but also that the challenges posed by North Korea are unique and therefore do not readily lend themselves to the approach that worked with Iran. Given the difficulties posed by this challenge, the issue is not whether a policy will succeed but which one might have the best chance of