The Trolley Problem By Phillipa Foot

To address the question of whether a morally relevant distinction exists between killing and letting die, Phillipa Foot considers the contrast between the agent of harm originating a fatal sequence and allowing a fatal sequence to occur. This is the basis for the objection presented in the Trolley Problem to which she attempts to offer a reply. In this paper, I will defend the Trolley Problem against Foot’s reply, arguing that switching the lever on the track is not just diverting a fatal sequence, but also initiating a new fatal sequence, and explain how this discredits Foot’s argument. Prior to discussing the Trolley Problem, Foot develops an argument in favor of a morally relevant distinction between killing and letting die. She focuses

A nearby bystander can divert the trolley onto a different track with only one person on it. To fulfil his positive duties towards the five to prevent them from dying, he must violate his negative duty not to bring harm to the one. This confronts Foot’s argument by highlighting the permissibility to override one’s negative duty for the positive duties of the five others—suggesting no moral distinction exists between killing and letting die. Foot replies to this by claiming this is a situation of diverting a fatal sequence instead of initiating the fatal

For example, assume two people are in a car and the driver is about to rearend Car A. The passenger grabs the wheel to divert hitting Car A, but in the process directs the car to hit Car B. Although grabbing the wheel diverted one accident, it simultaneously initiated another. As aforementioned, someone is an agent of harm if they initiated the fatal sequence resulting in it. In the case of the Trolley Problem, the one was not in guaranteed harm until the bystander chose to flip the lever. Thus, it would be wrong to conclude that the trolley being runaway alone contributed to the harm of the one, when the harm would not have reached the one if not for flipping the lever. Therefore, when the bystander flipped the lever, he simultaneously diverted one fatal sequence and initiated another.

Foot is likely to reject my objection by arguing that I am incorrect to assume the bystander can be held responsible for initiating a new sequence when the original sequence was beyond the bystander’s control. She would likely argue this matters because the bystander did not intend to bring harm to the one and was simply acting based on the limited options available; the result of harm to the one was