ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Penal Colonies method of execution, the Harrow (Apparatus), violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution?
ARGUMENT
Whether the Penal Colony choses to use the Apparatus, or not, it is within its discretion in choosing the mood of the execution. The question at hand is not whether or not capital punishment is legal, but the method of the execution. When execution is permitted, then the methods of execution are also permitted. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 41 (2008). Therefore, an opponent of the Apparatus falls on a heavy burden to prove the method of punishment, allowed by the authority of the state, are presumed proper; absent any proof the method is
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The question of whether or not a method of execution violates the rights of an individual stands on whether or not an individual is subjected to “cruel and unusual punishment.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Supreme Court has held that a method of execution does not need to be free of pain, but it must not present a substantial risk of pain or harm. Baze, 553 U.S. at 47. Furthermore, the Court has found that pain is an inherent side affect of all approved methods of execution. Gomez v. United States District Court, 503 U.S. 653, 655 (1992) (Stevens, J., …show more content…
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1879). Even though the Apparatus carries a significant risk of pain, it is not cruel within the meaning of the Eight Amendment. Methods of execution considered specifically objectionable within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment carry a sense of terror, pain and disgrace that can include emboweling of the living, beheading, quartering, public dissention and burning alive. Id. Still, the Wilkerson court found death by beheading to be lawful, even though the delivery terrifying and the delivery is grotesque. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 132. Consequently, extreme pain is inherent in approved methods of execution. Gomez, 503 U.S. at 655. Therefore, punishments are cruel when they involve lingering death or torture, but death is not not cruel under the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447