What Is Buddha's Argument Against Svabha

Sūnyatā and Paradoxes

Introduction

In his best known argumentative work, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), Nāgārjuna develops the “middle way” approach to metaphysics. He steers clear of both substantialism and nominalism, finding a path between the two. Crucial to his method is the Buddha 's theory of pratītyasamutpāda, or dependent arising. From this foundation, Nāgārjuna argues against svabhāva (essence) and for the notion of sūnyatā (emptiness). He contends that things do not exist in and of themselves, independently; rather, everything is “empty” of essence. In developing this concept, Nāgārjuna probes the limits of expressibility and thought. He argues that the nature of reality is ultimately inexpressible – that arguments about reality

These relations are: (1) an effect produces itself; (2) an effect is produced by something other than itself; (3) an effect both produces itself and is produced by something other than itself; (4) an effect is produced without a cause [3]. If the first view of causality is assumed to be true – that an effect produces itself – the cause and the effect are the same object. Causality, however, is a relationship between two objects, so there can be no causal relationship. Further, an object cannot be temporally prior to itself. Hence, this view is absurd. If the second of view of causality is taken to be true, cause and effect must be entirely distinct phenomena. This does not make sense, as the cause depends notionally on the effect (there must be an effect for it to be called a cause), and the effect depends existentially on the cause (it would not exist without the cause). Cause and effect cannot be independent, each with their own svabhāva. Considered as the logical conjunction of the first two views (both shown to be invalid), the third view must also be false. Considered as a cause containing the effect as a potentiality within itself, this view still does not permit cause and effect as independent objects. The fourth view can be seen as the absence of causation entirely – that there are no cause and effect, since there is no causal relationship. A

Anything that can be thought or said about reality is conventional, and not ultimately true. The ontology of that reality, correspondingly, is conventional; objects of this reality do not ultimately exist. But that they are empty of ultimate existence is an ultimate nature of these objects – an ultimate truth [2]. It cannot be thought or expressed, then, that they have this nature. This is a clear contradiction. By thinking or expressing that ultimate truth is inexpressible or uncharacterizable, one creates a paradox of expressibility.

Paradox of ontology Beneath this paradox of expressibility lies another paradox. As stated previously, Nāgārjuna argues that all phenomena are empty, and therefore have no svabhāva. The ultimate nature of things must then be emptiness. All things, then, simultaneously have and do not have svabhāva. As Garfield and Priest note, this ontological paradox is directly connected with the previous. Nothing can be expressed about a reality with no essence; emptiness, however, is the essence of reality, which allows for the expression that reality has no essence [2].