Abhidharma Vs Madhyamaka

Abhidharma and Madhyamaka use different conceptions of the Buddhist notion of two realities and truths. This notion posits an ultimate version of reality and truth, the realization of which leads to liberation from suffering. Abhidharma and Madhyamaka both accept this theory, but they approach it in different ways. This paper will outline approaches both schools take to interpret this notion. Following this, I will consider an Abhidharma objection to the approach of Madhyamaka and a response to that objection from Madhyamaka. Finally, I will argue that while at first the Madhyamaka approach to the notion of two truths seems to be much stronger and more coherent than the Abhidharma approach, the Abhidharma approach is stronger in the end. Notably,

The Madhyamaka view altogether rejects the existence of svabhāva, and by doing so, places itself in direct opposition to the Abhidharma view. Madhyamaka argues that with svabhāva (intrinsic essence), there is no way for dependent origination, a concept central to Buddhism, to occur. This claim arises out of Nāgārjuna’s Causal Argument, in which he denies that things with svabhāva can have causes and conditions, and thus that it is impossible for them to originate dependently. If something has svabhāva and is caused, as Abhidharma describes dharmas, then that thing depends on its cause for its existence. This implies that the thing’s essence is not irreducible, and that therefore, the thing lacks svabhāva after all. As Bartley says, “Were the dharmas to have essence, there could be no change, and if no change, no moral growth and no possibility of release from suffering” (86). Madhyamaka declares that everything, both conventional and ultimate, lacks an intrinsic essence (svabhāva). Therefore, they argue the difference between ultimate and conventional reality does not hinge upon what has

An adherent to Abhidharma may object to the Madhyamaka conception of two realities by first criticizing the picture it creates. When an ultimate reality is posited, it seems rational to think those who posit it should provide a description of what that reality is like. Madhyamaka, despite positing an ultimate reality, fails to give a positive description of that reality. They declare this task impossible, as it requires using concepts to describe ultimate reality, a non-conceptual view of the world. That said, if one fails to describe ultimate reality in a positive way, then they leave us without a specific target in our quest for enlightenment. Moreover, Abhidharma could object that Madhyamaka uses dependent origination to attempt to show that that svabhāva is impossible, and then they proceed to deny that ultimate reality originates dependently. In other words, Madhyamaka criticizes Abhidharma for holding a view in which ultimate reality has svabhāva, which, according to Madhyamaka, is a view where ultimate reality does not arise dependently. They then proceed to claim that ultimate reality need not, and in fact does not, arise dependently. Thus, they seem to criticize Abhidharma views for aligning with their own in some sense. They make their views align after this argument because Abhidharma believes the ultimately real consists of things with