Spinozism Analysis

Lange argues that the Leibnizian-Wolffian system – and specifically Wolff himself, is subject to a version of partial Spinozism. His predominant justification for this claim stems from a critique of Wolff's variation of pre-established harmony and application of the principle of sufficient reason to human actions. Lange holds that this view entails that everything occurs in their system under a necessary, mechanistic series of causes and effects, that is entirely incompatible with his spontaneous version of freedom.17 Lange reasons that the pre-established harmony collapses into the same infinite series of cause and effects that reduces human action to the same which undermines the possibility of morality. Since both true morality and true

Wolff claims that Spinoza confuses attributes with essential determinations, modes with attributes and being from another, and finally confuses substance with being from itself.19Wolff argues that the Spinozistic concept of "mode" is vague precisely because he does not explicitly define what it meant to be conceived through another. This is especially true since beyond modes and attributes it is impossible to conceive of substance, additionally problematizing his notion of substance.20 Since Spinoza's terminology is so vague his concluding substance monism does not necessarily follow. Since substance monism does not legitimately follow, Wolff does not have to be subject to the view that human beings are subject to the same necessary causal relationship to this substance. By problematizing Spinoza's substance monism, Wolff is not subject to Lange's third criterion for

In addition to distinguishing his system and criticizing the "total Spinozism", Wolff's system is more than capable of avoiding the accusations of "partial Spinozism". Wolff is allowed to posit contingency by allowing for the sufficient reason of the universe to the be the free will of God.27 Since God exists outside of the world, what happens in the world does not occur out of a fatal necessity, as it is was always possible for something to happen otherwise. The freedom that Lange supposes is not necessary to defend against universal fatalism, and therefore Wolff's account does not lead to fatalism, immoralism and atheism. This is especially the case when Wolff's account demands that God is outside the world and the world is not infinite. Wolff is capable of avoiding Lange's accusation of partial