The events of 9/11 propelled terrorism into the forefront of American policing. While threats were always present, the materialization of attack sparked a newfound change in strategic thinking about how to integrate counterterrorism efforts into local policing. Larger police agencies may have greater resource capabilities to regularly engage in counterterrorism activities, however, smaller organizations can build relationships and leverage already-held local expertise and position to promote an equally-valuable counterterrorism posture. Due to risk-based probabilities of occurrence, weighed against budget and resource constraints, police executives must assess and balance the need for, and cost of, counterterrorism activities with typical police work. Newman and Clarke (2008) offer a number of strategies that smaller organizations may consider when implementing such counterterrorism planning techniques. Police executives must recognize the power and risk of fear, being vigilant to understand that unquantifiable perception can lead to false positives, bias, distrust, and wasted effort. Consequently, fear can lead to heightened public attention to police …show more content…
Training, situational awareness, and the possession and use of personal protective equipment (PPE) are often causal factors in responder injury degree of severity (RAND, 2002). Responders can lessen their potential impacts, and theoretically improve their potential for positive (safe) outcome, when response activities allow for reduced time of exposure, increased distance from exposure agents, and the ability to shield against exposure agents (via appropriate PPE) (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999). In all these examples outcomes manifest in the form of damaged or destroyed structures, contaminated air, soil, or water, and unstable or uninhabitable lands, let alone human and animal injury, illness, and