Ambiguity In Frankenstein

For instance, one could say that Frankenstein's monster is not dissimilar to its human counterpart. Although the monster was created by collecting the most perfect parts of different human bodies, this practice did not turn the creature into a perfect human (Shelley, 1818). Nevertheless, the monster is used as a means to describe "our historical and hysterical responses to body fragmentation" (Clarke, 2002:28), which have demonstrated that the human body is an organic fusion of different parts (Baldick, 1987). The reproduction of the human species itself relies upon a process of natural selection, which cherry-picks the features that are best suited to ensure human longevity to manifest themselves in a human being. Thus, both Frankenstein's

The idea that the human condition is monstrous refers to the fact that it is one of plurality (Arendt, 1958). This suggests that the human condition is in fact complex and that it functions through a permanently partial set of identities (Haraway, 1991; Hayles, 1999). Although certain characteristics have come together to define what the human is and what the human is not, the notion of the hybrid shows that these features are flexible and can come together to shape the human condition. In fact, some theorists have gone as far as claiming that technology has "helped … make human nature what it is" today, as it has "co-evolved throughout the millennia with human beings" (Hayles, 2005:144). This statement suggests that the human condition has been shaped by the technologies of our time and that it is, therefore, not singular. Similarly, others have stated that our "bodies are the product[s] of tool-using adaptations" (Haraway, 1991:22), which refutes the originality of the human condition. Overall, these claims displace the human species and suggest that "the self, like knowledge, is a shifting construct" (Clarke, 2002:28). And, these changes can be perceived as monstrous as they do not allow the human condition to stabilize

For centuries, certain behaviours have been considered as exclusive to the humankind., such as consciousness and emotions (Fukuyama, 2002). Yet, the developing relations between humans and non-human Others calls for a redefinition of the former theory. This is because the hybridity of the human being has demonstrated that non-human organisms do not act too dissimilarly to the human condition. In fact, humanity could be considered as a "fusion of outsider identities" formed by "complex political-historical layerings" (Haraway, 1991:174). This suggests that there is nothing natural that binds humans to one another, just as there is nothing that does not bind them to other organisms (Haraway, 1991). Hereafter, "humans are no longer" considered to be "the most important things in the universe" (Pepperell, 2003:177), as their uniqueness is dismantled. An example of this displacement can be observed through the animals rights movement, where people have come together to agree that animals may be sentient too. The movement has aimed to protect animal species by implementing a set of laws that punish the human who breaches these rules of conduct, which places the human in a subordinate position when compared to the animal. This attitudinal shift towards other organisms displaces the human's position of centrality in the universe, which may produce anxieties in terms of the social