Pursuant to Miranda, a suspect must voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and to the presence or assistance of counsel to render subsequent statements made admissible. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 475.) Moreover, a waiver must be clear, unequivocal and unambiguously made to be valid. (Berghuis v. Tompkins (2010) 560 U.S. 370.) Nonetheless, when an officer receives an ambiguous response, they have a duty to clarify the ambiguity prior to custodial interrogation. (United States v. Rodriguez (2008) 518 F.3d 1072 (holding defendant’s response “I’m good for tonight,” ambiguous response for a valid waiver, requiring further clarification as to what the defendant actually meant).)
Furthermore, a
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(United States v. Bradshaw (1991) 935 F.2d 295.) Nonetheless, the Prosecution bears the heavy burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, the validity of a Miranda waiver and voluntariness of a subsequent statement. (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 167; see also Blackburn v. Alabama (1960) 361 U.S. 199 (holding subsequent statements involuntary when not the product of rational intellect and free will); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) 412 U.S. 218 (where the voluntariness of the confession depends on both the actions of the police and the vulnerable subjective state of the person being …show more content…
Moreover, Meyers never received a written Miranda waiver, which would discuss the consequences of abandonment while eliminating any ambiguities. As such, Officer Taylor had a duty to clarify Meyers’ response to ascertain whether Meyers actually waived his right, understood those rights or if he wanted a lawyer present during interrogation. Although interrogated on video, Officer Taylor was unable to secure an audio recording. Without audio feedback, there’s no way to determine whether Meyers’ waiver or subsequent statements made thereof were a product of intimidation or coercion in lieu of free