Organizational Behavior Case Study: American Airlines Flight 1420

American Airlines Flight 1420
June 1, 1999, a McDonnel Douglas DC-9-82, dispatched as American Airlines 1420, crashed after it had overran runway 4R, at Little Rock National Airport. The flight claimed the lives of 11 people, including the captain, and 105 passengers received serious or minor injuries, including the first officer and flight attendants (NTSB, 1999). According to the NTSB, this accident was due to pilot error (NTSB, 1999). This report will exam all human interaction as well as performance, utilizing Dr. Scott Shappell’s and Dr. Doug Wiegmann’s HFACS model, so one may find the route cause of the errors, and prevent similar accidents in the future.
HFACS Level 4: Organizational Influences
Errors aren’t created at the bottom

Airlines are constantly under pressure, due to unprecedented schedules, competition and flight planning. Everything must be on time to make a dollar at the end of the day, and American Airlines is no different. Since 1934, American Airlines has been owned by the AMR Corporation and headquarter in Dallas, Texas. The airlines competes with all airlines throughout North America, the Caribbean, Latin America, Europe, and the Pacific (NTSB, 1999). According to the NTSB, the operational process, in regards to weather were too vague (NTSB, 1999). In fact, when an American Airlines training represented was asked about training, in regards to operating in thunderstorms, the manager state, “Our pilots are forbidden to enter or depart a terminal blanketed by thunderstorm” (Bogaert, 2013). What is

Unfortunately, the opposite can be said. Unsafe supervision, or level three of the HFACS model has four categories; inadequate supervision, defined as the roll of supervisors to provide personnel with the chance of success, with opportunities such as training, leadership and oversight; planning of unsafe operations, referring to operations that can be accepted and different during emergencies, but unacceptable during standard practices; failure to correct known issues, defined as safety deficiencies that are just accepted; supervisor violations, defined as willfully disregarding regulations (Rodrigues & Cusick, 2012). With that said, when the decision was shifted to the PIC, this accident could have been avoided. Unfortunately, the pilot had what the NTSB calls ‘lets-go-ides’, a buildup of impatience, until a pilot doesn’t care what condition the flight will be, he or she just wants to complete their duty day (Bogaert, 2013). Because of his impatience, the PIC provided inadequate supervision to his crew, by placing them into the situation. During the inappropriate operation, the pilot stated, “I hate droning around at night, when I don’t know where I am” (Bogaert, 2013). His statement made it is clear that the he failed to correct a known problem. The PIC knew that the flight was at risk, and instead of rerouting, he remained on